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Abstract 
 
  The most important and illuminating early writing on Brown v. Bd. of Education 
is a nine-page essay by Charles Black. Black memorably shows that segregation was a 
crucial part of a racial caste system. At the same time, he cuts through legal abstractions 
that made it difficult to answer the question whether the Court’s decision was sufficiently 
“neutral.” At the same time, Black’s argument suffers from two serious problems: 
formalism and institution-blindness. Black writes as if his interpretation of the equal 
protection clause can be simply read off the clause, and he does not engage the complex 
institutional problems that were raised by the Court’s decision. Nonetheless, the legal 
culture needs more voices like Black’s. 
   
 
  Of all the early writing on Brown v. Bd. of Education,
1 the most striking is a nine-
page essay by Charles Black.
2 Black’s essay is striking because of its simplicity, its 
concreteness, and its realism—its clear statement of what the system of segregation did 
and meant, and of the relationship between that statement and Black’s reading of the 
Constitution.  
 
For three reasons, Black’s essay is worth careful consideration today. First, it 
gives a vivid sense of the social realities that Brown actually confronted—a sense that 
was entirely missing from the legal culture at the time, and one that often seems to have 
been lost in contemporary discussions of the Brown problem. Second, Black’s essay 
offers a distinctive understanding of what the equal protection clause should be taken, 
above all, to forbid: the maintenance of a caste system. That understanding of the clause 
seems to me correct, and it bears on a number of issues today. Third, Black provides a 
sophisticated and morally committed version of a certain approach to constitutional 
                                                 
* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago Law School. 
1 347 US 483 (1954). 
 argument, one that retains considerable influence. I think that for all its virtues, his 
approach suffers from the serious vices of formalism and institutional blindness. In 
particular, Black’s approach suffers from its failure to see the issues that have arisen as a 
result of the institutional turn of post-1980s constitutional law.
3 
 
We can learn a great deal about Brown by reading Black sympathetically. We can 
learn something about constitutional interpretation by reading him skeptically. Let us 
begin by listening to him. 
 
I. The Sovereign Prerogative of Philosophers 
 
Black begins with a two-part argument that he describes as “awkwardly simple.”
4 
First, the equal protection clause is best read to forbid state law from significantly 
disadvantaging the Negro race as such. Second, segregation counts as a massive 
intentional disadvantaging of the Negro race as such. “No subtlety at all. Yet I cannot 
disabuse myself of the idea that that is really all there is to the segregation cases. If both 
these propositions can be supported by a preponderance of argument, the cases were 
rightly decided.”
5 
 
  Black attempts to support the first proposition by reference to precedent. In 
several cases, the Court had seemed to endorse it. To be sure, Plessy v. Ferguson
6 
appeared to be “a faltering from this principle.” But even in Plessy, the Court did not 
repudiate the principle. On the contrary, the Court found it necessary to show that any 
disadvantaging from segregation was produced not by state law, but by the “choice” of 
those who construed it as a form of disadvantaging. Hence the fault of Plessy lay not in 
                                                                                                                                                 
2 See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 Yale LJ 421 (1960). 
3 See Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 Mich L Rev 885 (2002). 
The institutional turn has many strands and can be found in many places. See, e.g., Gerald Rosenberg, The 
Hollow Hope (1993) (emphasizing limitations of courts in producing social change); Mark Tushnet, Taking 
the Constitution Away from the Courts (1999) (raising doubts about judicial review); David A. Strauss, 
Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 877 (1996) (emphasizing common law 
approach toward Constitution). For my own views, see Cass R. Sunstein, One Case At A Time (1999). 
4 Id. at 421. 
5 Id.  
6 163 US 537 (1896). 
2 its treatment of principle, but “in the psychology and sociology” of its approach to racial 
separation.
7 Of course Black recognizes that the idea of equal protection allows 
disadvantages to be placed, intentionally, on some people rather than all; bad drivers can 
be deprived of drivers’ licenses. The real question is whether there is a reasonable basis 
for inequality. This question is not always easy to answer. “But history puts it squarely 
out of doubt that the chief and all-dominating purpose” of the equal protection clause 
“was to ensure equal protection for the Negro.”
8 Thus the fourteenth amendment rules out 
all possible arguments for discrimination against African-Americans.  
 
  Black is aware that history is not without some ambiguity here and that some 
people believe that at the time of adoption, the fourteenth amendment was not taken to 
forbid racial segregation. By way of response, he urges that any judgment about “the 
‘intent’ of the men of 1866 on segregation as we know it calls for a far chancier guess 
than is commonly supposed, for they were unacquainted with the institution as it prevails 
in the American South today. To guess their verdict upon the institution as it functions in 
the mid-twentieth century supposes an imaginary hypothesis which grows more 
preposterous as it is sought to be made more vivid.”
9 
 
 It is at this point that Black starts to pick up steam. He asks whether segregation 
violates the equality principle, properly understood. He acknowledges that equality “has 
marginal areas where philosophic difficulties are encountered. But if a whole race of 
people finds itself confined within a system which is set up and continued for the very 
purpose of keeping it in an inferior station, and if the question is the solemnly 
propounded whether such a race is being treated ‘equally,’ I think we ought to exercise 
one of the sovereign prerogatives of philosophers—that of laughter.” This is my favorite 
sentence in Black’s essay; it ranks among the best sentences ever written by an American 
law professor. 
 
                                                 
7 Id. at 422. 
8 Id. at 423. 
9 Id. at 424. 
3 Black continues that the real “question remaining (after we get our laughter under 
control) is whether” segregation meets that description. Here Black confesses “a tendency 
to start laughing all over again.” The initial reason is that he himself grew up under 
conditions of segregation, and “it never occurred to anyone, white or colored, to question 
its meaning.” Nor was personal experience the only support for this conclusion. 
“Segregation in the South comes down in apostolic succession from slavery and the Dred 
Scott case. The South fought to keep slavery, and lost. Then it tried the Black Codes, and 
lost. Then it looked around for something else and found segregation.”
10 There was 
nothing consensual about segregation. It was imposed by whites, not agreed to by all. 
 
Drawing on national experience, Black contends that separate was almost never 
really equal. When African-Americans were given separate beaches and washrooms, they 
were far worse than the beaches and washrooms given to whites. In education, “colored 
schools have been so disgracefully inferior to white schools that only ignorance can 
excuse those who have remained acquiescent members of a community that lived the 
Molochian child-destroying lie that put them forward as ‘equal.’”
11 Segregation could be 
understood only in its historical setting, as part of a culture in which a “society that has 
just lost the Negro as a slave, that has just lost out in an attempt to put him under quasi-
servile ‘Codes,’ the society that views his blood as a contamination and his name as an 
insult, the society that extralegally imposes on him every humiliating mark of low caste 
and that until yesterday kept him in line by lynching . . .” Those who see what 
segregation actually means will not fall victim to arguments that amount to “one-step-
ahead-of-the-marshal correction” (another memorable phrase from Black, capturing 
many forms of legal argument). 
 
Black also seeks to explain the evident puzzlement of those in the legal culture 
about the plain “fact that the social meaning of segregation is the putting of the Negro in 
a position of walled-off inferiority.”
12 How, he asks, can people actually wonder about 
that not-hard question? Black contends that the answer lies in a fundamental mistake, 
                                                 
10 Id. 
11 Id., at 426. 
4 which is to ask the question whether “segregation amounts to discrimination” 
acontextually and in a historical vacuum. For lawyers and judges, the question cannot 
sensibly be put that way. The real question is whether segregation amounts to 
discrimination when it “is imposed by law in the twentieth century in certain specific 
states in the American Union.” That question is hilariously easy. If it seems difficult, it is 
only because of the absence of a “ritually sanctioned way in which the Court, as a Court, 
can permissibly learn what is obvious to everybody else and to the Justices as 
individuals.” But if this is the situation, the task of legal acumen is to find “ways to make 
it permissible for the Court to use what it knows; any other counsel is of despair.” 
 
To be sure, it had been argued, most prominently by Herbert Wechsler,
13 that the 
Brown decision should be understood to involve a conflict between the associational 
preferences of whites and those of African-Americans. Wechsler thought that if the Court 
was bound by neutral principles, that conflict would be hard to resolve: “For me, 
assuming equal facilities, the question posed by state-sponsored segregation is not one of 
discrimination at all. Its human and its constitutional dimensions lie entirely elsewhere, in 
the denial by the state of freedom to associate, a denial that impinges in the same way on 
any groups and races that may be involved. I think, and I hope not without foundation, 
that the Southern white also pays heavily for segregation, not only in the sense of guilt he 
must carry but also in the benefits he is denied.”
14 Wechsler supported this claim with an 
anecdote: “In the days when I was joined with Charles H. Houston in a litigation in the 
Supreme Court, before the present building was constructed, he did not suffer more than I 
in knowing that we had to go to Union Station to lunch together during the recess.”
15  
 
Here again we can hear Black’s ringing laughter. Houston was an exceptionally 
distinguished lawyer, unable to eat lunch with his white co-counsel in the nation’s capitol 
when engaged in legal argument before the nation’s highest court. In this world (almost) 
anything is possible, but it would be astonishing if Houston “did not suffer more than” 
                                                                                                                                                 
12 Id. at 427. 
13 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv L Rev 1 (1959). 
14 Wechsler, supra note, at 34. 
15 Id. 
5 Wechsler as a result of racial segregation. In any case Wechsler’s general challenge to 
Brown was simple: A preference for one set of associational preferences seems to violate 
the obligation of neutrality. How can a Court committed to neutral principles choose one 
set over another? To this Black responds that Wechsler has badly misconceived the idea 
of equality and hence that of neutrality. Of course any requirement of equality will “entail 
some disagreeableness for” those who benefit from inequality. In other words, the idea of 
equality does not counsel equality between equality and inequality; it favors the former. 
If the fourteenth amendment is committed to equality, then it settles the question of how 
to handle the conflict between the competing associational claims.  
 
  Black concludes that Brown is correct if the Constitution is “inconsistent with any 
device that in fact relegates the Negro race to a position of inferiority.”
16 In an uncannily 
prescient statement, he urges that “in the end the decisions will be accepted by the 
profession on just that basis.” He contends that the Court’s “judgments, in law and in 
fact, are as right and true as any that ever was uttered.” In a footnote, Black makes just 
one critical remark about the Court’s opinion, as distinct from its holding: “the venial 
fault of the opinion consists in its not spelling out that segregation . . . is perceptibly a 
means of ghettoizing the imputedly inferior race. (I would conjecture that the motive for 
this omission was reluctance to go into the distasteful details of the southern caste 
system.)”
17  
 
II. Caste and Context 
 
  Black’s essay has two cardinal virtues. The first is that he provides a clear and 
appealing interpretation of the equal protection clause. In Black’s view, the clause forbids 
state law from creating anything like a caste system. He uses the term “caste” twice, and 
an anticaste principle
18 unambiguously infuses his treatment of the problem of 
segregation and indeed the principle for which he takes the equal protection clause to 
                                                 
16Black, supra, at 429. 
17 Id. 
18 I have argued in favor of this idea in Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 2410 
(1994). 
6 stand. What makes racial segregation impermissible is that it works, in intention and in 
effect, to turn African-Americans into members of a lower caste. Black does not quote 
from Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson, but it is reasonable to 
speculate that one of Harlan’s sentences helped to inspire him: “There is no caste here.”
19 
Note in this regard Black’s criticism of the Court’s opinion, charitably relegated to a 
footnote, for its failure to spell out what segregation really is and does. Within the legal 
culture, the failure to explore the “southern caste system,” or even to name it as such, was 
remedied above all by Black’s own article. 
 
  The anticaste principle behind Black’s argument has not played the dominant role 
in the constitutional law of equal protection. The clearest use of that principle was in 
Loving v. Virginia,
20 in which the Court struck down a ban on racial intermarriage with a 
reference to the effort to maintain “White Supremacy.”
21 But in the modern era, the equal 
protection clause has been read to forbid governments from drawing distinctions on the 
basis of race
22—a reading that is fundamentally different from Black’s. Notice that Black 
did not contend that segregation was unlawful because it amounted to an effort to make 
race relevant for purposes of policy; he did not argue for a principle of color-blindness. 
His claim was that segregation was unlawful because it amounted to an effort to keep one 
group below another—to maintain the Southern caste system. In the modern era, this 
view of the equal protection clause has had only one strong endorsement in a majority 
opinion: Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court in the Virginia Military Institute case.
23 
I believe that the anticaste principle is the correct reading of the clause, even though its 
implementation would impose formidable burdens on courts.
24  
 
The second virtue of Black’s essay is that it offers a vivid, concrete, and realistic 
understanding of segregation—a historicized understanding that cuts through the almost 
comically uninformative and abstract accounts offered by Wechsler and others. Black’s 
                                                 
19 163 US at xx. 
20 388 US 1 (1967). 
21 Id. at xx. 
22 See Adarand Contractors v. Pena, 115 S Ct 2097 (1995). Of course the doctrine here has become quite 
complex and unruly. 
23 US (199X). 
7 emphasis on the need to attend to “social meaning” is highly illuminating here; he rightly 
suggests that segregation can be appreciated only if it is taken as a particular practice in 
the American South. He is also correct to suggest that we ought to meet with “laughter” 
the question whether racial segregation might not be a way of treating African-Americans 
equally. Not incidentally, and in Black’s spirit, I believe that laughter is also the 
appropriate reaction to the equally solemn question, usually answered “yes” by the 
current Supreme Court,
25 whether affirmative action programs deprive white Americans 
of the equal protection of the laws. To be sure, such programs present difficult questions 
of policy; they are often bad ideas. But on the constitutional question, the extraordinary 
success of constitutional assaults on affirmative action programs is shocking and 
disgraceful.  
 
Black’s understanding of the anticaste principle does leave many open questions. 
At times he speaks of purpose. At times he speaks of effect, as in the suggestion that the 
Constitution “is inconsistent with any device that in fact relegates the Negro race to a 
position of inferiority.” We can imagine cases in which either intent or effect is operative, 
but not both. In any case many officials practices might be seen as entrenching a caste 
system based on race. Does Black’s principle raise doubts about poll taxes, literacy tests 
for voting, educational funding systems that disproportionately benefit whites, or 
admissions requirements for universities that ensure overwhelming white student bodies? 
Would Black’s principle raise questions about inadequate welfare and job training 
programs? Do these also “relegate” African-Americans to a position of inferiority? And if 
the equal protection clause forbids the maintenance of a system of racial caste, does it 
also forbid the maintenance of a caste system based on gender? It would be possible to 
generalize, from Black’s understanding of the equal protection clause, a principle that 
forbids all official practices that turn morally irrelevant characteristics into a basis for 
social subordination. Such a generalization is very much in the spirit of Black’s analysis. 
But is this what he intends? And would the anticaste principle, thus understood, bear on 
current debates about discrimination on the basis of disability and sexual orientation? 
                                                                                                                                                 
24 See id. 
25 See note XX supra. 
8 Would it require something like an Americans with Disabilities Act as a matter of 
constitutional law? Would it require states to recognize same-sex marriages? 
 
On Black’s behalf we might respond that however these questions might be 
answered, the segregation issue was an easy one. With respect to that issue, the 
conventional responses do have a “one-step-ahead-of-the-marshal” character. It is hardly 
a decisive objection to Black’s argument that he has not specified all of its implications. 
Insofar as Black sketched an appealing conception of the equal protection clause, and 
memorably argued why segregation is inconsistent with that conception, he provided an 
enduring service for the legal culture. 
 
III. Of Formalism and Institution-Blindness 
 
The vices of Black’s essay are as interesting as its virtues, and they are no less 
important. In a way, Black’s essay seems of its time; its sense of moral engagement with 
the issue of segregation has the unmistakable feel of certain academic writing in the 
late1960s. But there is also a sense in which it is barely dated, taking the form of an 
entirely recognizable kind of modern legal argument, academic and otherwise. Black’s 
effort to identify the principle behind the equal protection clause, and his explanation of 
why the practice in question violates that principle, is akin to countless current 
explorations of constitutional issues.  
 
Like many of those explorations, Black’s effort suffers from two serious 
problems. The first is a kind of formalism—an approach that ignores the inevitable role 
of evaluative judgments in constitutional interpretation. The second is a blindness to 
institutional considerations—a neglect of variables that might make courts hesitate to 
implement what would, as a matter of principle, count as the best interpretation of the 
Constitution. The legal culture has obtained a far better understanding of those 
considerations in the last two decades, and they help to illuminate difficulties in Black’s 
approach. 
 
9 A. Black’s Formalism 
 
Formalism first. Black assumes far too readily that the equal protection clause 
forbids any intentional disadvantaging of African-Americans. The clause does not 
unambiguously do any such thing. It would be possible to understand the clause far more 
narrowly, in a way that does not touch the practice of “separate but equal.” All by itself, 
Plessy v. Ferguson provides some evidence of the plausibility of this reading: If an 
overwhelming majority of the Supreme Court concluded, not long after ratification, that 
the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid “separate but equal,” then there is reason to 
think that this interpretation is at least textually plausible. In any case, a great deal of 
historical research supports the view that the Fourteenth Amendment was not meant to 
eliminate racial segregation and indeed that it was not meant to prohibit all intentional 
disadvantaging of African-Americans.
26 The Reconstruction Congress expressly 
permitted the schools of the District of Columbia to remain segregated.
27 The Fourteenth 
Amendment was meant to constitutionalize the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the 
sponsors of that Act specifically disclaimed any intention to interfere with segregated 
education.
28  
 
In these circumstances, it is implausible to say that the equal protection clause 
necessarily has the meaning that Black ascribes to it. On narrow “originalist” grounds, 
Brown is not simple to defend. Without adopting anything like Black’s general 
understanding of the clause, Judge Michael McConnell, a committed originalist, has 
made the most sustained, even heroic effort to demonstrate that racial segregation was 
inconsistent with the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
29 McConnell 
places a great deal of emphasis on the efforts of Republicans in the Reconstruction 
Congress to include schools within the scope of the 1875 Civil Rights Act; and he does 
provide strong evidence that many and perhaps most legislators in that Congress believed 
                                                 
26 See Richard Kluger, Simple Justice 633-34 (1976); Frank and Munro, The Original Understanding of 
Equal Protection of the Laws, 1972 Wash U L Q 421, 460-62 (1977); Raoul Berger, Government by 
Judiciary 123-25 (1977). 
27 See Frank and Munro, supra, at 460-62. 
28 See Statement of James Wilson, Cong Globe, 39
th Cong, 1
st Sess 1117-1118 (1866). 
29 See Michael McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation decisions, 81 Va L Rev 947 (1995). 
10 that segregated schools were inconsistent with the principles underlying the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The fact remains, however, that the post-ratification views of members of 
Congress are not decisive evidence about constitutional meaning. Even more 
fundamentally, the efforts to ban segregated schools ultimately failed (even if they 
received considerable support within both houses of Congress). At most, Judge 
McConnell has demonstrated that Congress had the constitutional authority to outlaw 
racial segregation under the enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He does 
not come close to showing what is necessary to establish the correctness of Brown on 
originalist grounds -- that the equal protection clause was originally understood as a self-
executing ban on such segregation. Certainly Black does not demonstrate or even 
maintain that it was so understood. 
 
It is not even clear what approach to constitutional interpretation Black means to 
endorse. Much of his argument seems to be roughly originalist, in the sense that he seems 
to understand the meaning of the clause in accordance with the understanding of its 
ratifiers. But he investigates the original understanding barely at all; his is not a historical 
exegesis. The most he does is to urge, in response to originalist-style objections to 
Brown, that any understanding of the view of 1866 calls for a “guess.” His fragmentary 
argument on this count is quite sophisticated: “To guess their verdict upon the institution 
as it functions in the mid-twentieth century supposes an imaginary hypothesis which 
grows more preposterous as it is sought to be made more vivid.” This suggestion 
presages some of the best contemporary discussions of how to deal with the original 
understanding in unanticipated circumstances.
30 But all this point shows is that the 
original understanding is not necessarily fatal to Brown; Black does not urge that the 
original understanding, carried forward to 1954, condemns school segregation. If a 
“guess” is what is required, then Black’s reading of the fourteenth amendment is not, 
strictly speaking, mandatory according to the tools that he himself purports to be using.  
 
                                                 
30 See Mark Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Neutral Principles and Interpretivism, 
96 Harv L Rev 781 (1983); Larry Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 Tex L Rev 1165 (1993). 
11 What tools is he actually using? To the extent that Black’s reading emerges as 
permissive, a choice among plausible alternatives, we should see him as engaged in a 
distinctive kind of legal formalism—regrettably, the dishonorable kind,
31 one that 
pretends that a legal text has an unambiguous meaning even though normative judgments 
must be made in order to invest it with that meaning. For a modern analogue, consider the 
view, endorsed by a majority of the current Supreme Court, that strict scrutiny is required 
for affirmative action programs because the Constitution forbids states from denying 
equal protection to “any person.”
32 This too is a form of dishonorable formalism: The fact 
that the clause protects “any person” is neither here nor there on the question whether 
strict scrutiny, or something else, should be applied to affirmative action programs. 
 
In the end, Black’s reading of the equal protection clause can only be understood  
interpretive in Ronald Dworkin’s sense of the word.
33 Black is attempting not to track the 
unambiguous meaning of that clause but to make best constructive sense of it, in a way 
that inevitably involves judgments of Black’s own. Among the various possible 
interpretations, those that “fit” the clause and its history, Black is venturing an approach 
that seems most attractive to him on normative grounds. This point is not meant as an 
objection to Black’s conclusions about the clause or the case. For constitutional 
interpretation, there is no avoiding normative judgments of one or another kind.
34 And 
perhaps his interpretation is preferable to any other; in fact I believe that it is.
35 The 
problem is that Black does not defend his approach against imaginable alternatives; he 
writes as if the principle can be read off the Constitution itself. If we were to be harsh, we 
might even say that Black’s confidence about his view of the clause emerges as a form of 
self-delusion, a claim of necessity that masks normative judgments of Black’s own. 
                                                 
31 This kind of dishonorable formalism is an ugly sibling of the entirely honorable (though controversial) 
view that texts should be interpreted in accordance with their ordinary meaning and that judges ought not to 
rely on legislative history, statutory “purpose,” and the like. The best discussion is Adrian Vermeule, 
Interpretive Choice, NYU L Rev. 
32 See City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 US 469 (1989). 
33 See Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1985). 
34 I cannot defend this point in detail here. See Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict 
(1996), for general discussion. Note that originalism itself represents a normative choice – to be originalist 
– and then in hard cases, of which Brown (as Black shows) is an example, originalists are unlikely to be 
able to make decisions simply by looking at history. 
35 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 2410 (1994). 
12  
B. Black and Judicial Fallibility 
 
  The second problem is that Black neglect institutional issues. He see his tasks as 
twofold: first, identification of the proper reading of the equal protection clause and 
second, measurement of segregation against the clause, properly read. This approach to 
the Constitution was typical of academic work in the 1960s and 1970s. It remains 
common today. But it has a significant weakness. Black does not admit the possibility 
that for a court, the proper reading of the clause is closely attuned to the institutional 
limitations of judges. The institutional turn of post-1980s scholarship has pointed to 
several reasons why this might be so. Judicial efforts to promote social reform might not 
be productive; they might even be counterproductive, endangering the very goals that the 
judges seek.
36 Judicial judgments about (legally relevant) moral values might not be 
reliable, and hence it might be best if judges, aware of their own moral fallibility, are 
reluctant to impose those values on the nation.
37 In any case judicial insistence on certain 
moral commitments, even appealing ones, might preempt democratic deliberation on the 
underlying questions; and if citizens have a right to be self-governing, judges might be 
interpret the Constitution with that right in mind. 
 
If any of these claims is correct, then judges with a set of reasonable, optional 
interpretations might select the interpretation that the one that minimizes the judicial role 
in American society—not because that interpretation is best out of context, but because it 
is best-suited to judicial capacities. Emphasizing that their own readings are prone to 
error, judges might read constitutional clauses, whenever possible, in such a way as to 
minimize judicial intrusions into democratic processes. James Bradley Thayer famously 
defended “the rule of clear mistake”—the view that courts should uphold legislation 
unless it is unambiguously unconstitutional.
38 A limited reading of the equal protection 
clause, one that would not reach segregation, might be defended on the ground that it 
                                                 
36 See Rosenberg, supra note. 
37 See Tushnet, supra. 
38 See James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 
Harv L Rev 129 (1893). 
13 reduces the judicial role in American life. I am not defending that limited reading; I am 
simply noticing that Black fails to explore the arguments that might be made in its favor. 
 
Note that this limited reading would be a court-specific one. It would not preclude 
the possibility that other institutions, not facing the limitations of the judiciary, would 
understand the equal protection clause more broadly. Black did not pause to consider the 
possibility that in some areas, constitutional rights might be judicially underenforced, for 
institutional reasons stemming from the courts’ properly limited role in American 
government.
39 If we take seriously a more general anticaste principle, judicial limitations 
seem highly relevant. A court that is committed to counteract the caste-like features of 
American society would closely scrutinize a number of seemingly neutral practices that 
have racially discriminatory effects, such as tests for education and employment on 
which whites do systematically better than African-Americans. To say the least, this close 
scrutiny would put courts into an awkward position.
40  
 
I have suggested the possibility that judges should adopt a narrower 
understanding of the equal protection clause simply because of an awareness of their own 
institutional weaknesses, recognizing that the broader reading might be acceptable or 
even preferable for other branches of government. If the meaning of the Constitution, at 
the judicial level, is a product of substantive theory and institutional constraint, then 
Black’s reading of the equal protection clause might be rejected on the ground that it 
emphasizes the former but neglects the latter. Compare the contemporary question 
whether the Constitution requires states to recognize same-sex marriages. Let us suppose, 
as I believe, that the best interpretation of the equal protection clause does so require—
that states have no adequate basis for discriminating against gays and lesbians in this 
way. Even if this is so, federal courts might hesitate to insist on that interpretation for 
prudential reasons.
41 The nation might reject the courts’ interpretation, in a way that 
                                                 
39 See Lawrence Sager, Fair Measure: The Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv L Rev 
1212 (1978). 
40 See Washington v. Davis, 426 US 229 (1976). 
41 The case of state courts is different. See Cass R. Sunstein, The New Republic (2003). 
14 disserves the very values at stake—a possibility that is relevant, whether or not it is 
decisive, for constitutional law.
42  
 
Alternatively, judges might have chosen to read the equal protection clause 
narrowly in the particular context of segregation, not because they are generally error-
prone, but in the interest of ensuring that courts are not placed in an especially difficult 
remedial role. There can be no doubt that the political question doctrine has a pale echo 
in the numerous cases interpreting constitutional clauses so as to avoid collisions with 
other institutions.
43 In some contexts, the echo deserves to be a bit louder, simply because 
a ruling would force courts to engage in managerial tasks that are beyond their 
competence. Black does not confront this possibility in the context of school segregation, 
and it is a serious gap in his argument. His silence here is characteristic. Later in his life, 
Black made eloquent pleas on behalf of a constitutional requirement that governments 
provide a decent economic minimum -- a social safety net below which no citizen may be 
allowed to fall.
44 Put to one side the question whether this requirement can be found in 
the Constitution through appropriate interpretive methods. Even if it can, judicial 
oversight of the welfare system would put courts in a position for which they are 
especially ill-suited.
45 
 
None of this means that Brown is wrong; like nearly everyone else (now, as 
opposed to during the 1960s, when the legal culture was sharply divided), I believe that 
Black was right to insist that it was right. But Black’s argument on its behalf is badly 
incomplete. It is not sufficient to identify the most appealing interpretation of a clause 
and then to measure a challenged practice against that interpretation. A pervasive 
question has to do with judicial capacities and competence.  
 
Conclusion 
 
                                                 
42 For the classic discussion, by a contemporary of Black, see Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous 
Branch (1965). 
43 See, e.g., Rostker v, Goldberg, 453 US 57 (1981); this term’s campaign finance decision. 
44 See Charles Black, A New Birth of Freedom (1997). 
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  In a sense, Black’s argument can be seen as a great triumph for legal realism in 
American constitutional law. What makes his essay so important is that it cuts through 
abstractions, pervasive in law schools and in courts, that had made it nearly impossible to 
see what Brown was about. I have criticized Black for his formalism and for his neglect 
of institutional considerations. But we need more voices like Charles Black’s.  
 
To see why, return to Herbert Wechsler’s puzzlement about the lawfulness of the 
segregation decision. If we are to laugh at Wechsler, our laughter had better not be 
complacent. We should not treat Wechsler as a relic of history, someone whose errors 
cannot find analogues today. After all, Wechsler was extremely active in the civil rights 
movement, to which he was personally dedicated. As a lawyer, he helped to assist 
Thurgood Marshall and others in the attack on segregation. His difficulty in justifying 
Brown was not motivated by the slightest sympathy for the practices that the Court 
invalidated. Wechsler was anguished by that difficulty. 
 
  Wechsler’s closing question was this: “Given a situation where the state must 
practically choose between denying the association to those who wish it or imposing it on 
those who would avoid it, is there a basis in neutral principles for holding that the 
Constitution demands that the claims for association should prevail?”
46 Questions like 
this continue to haunt the legal system. But Black’s answer is simple. By its very nature, 
the equality principle is not neutral between inequality and equality; and this is not an 
embarrassment for the equality principle. That answer is not just Black’s but Brown’s as 
well. I think that it has enduring and insufficiently appreciated implications for 
constitutional law in general. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
45 I discuss this question in Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (1993). 
46 Wechsler, supra note. 
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